Desafios sistema de comércio multilateral

Política de desenvolvimento internacional | Revue internationale de politique de développement.

Ajuda, Economias Emergentes e Políticas Globais.

Os desafios enfrentados pelo sistema multilateral de negociação para abordar os objetivos das políticas públicas globais.

Apesar de um recorde de aumento de 14,5 por cento nas exportações mundiais de mercadorias, os efeitos da crise financeira e da recessão global ainda impedem uma recuperação econômica mais rápida. Os preços do petróleo relativamente elevados, combinados com o desemprego persistente e as medidas destinadas a reduzir os déficits orçamentários, prejudicaram as perspectivas de crescimento a curto prazo.

Enquanto o comércio Sul-Sul continua a explodir, os desequilíbrios comerciais - ou seja, a diferença entre as exportações e as importações - aumentaram em 2018 em relação a 2009 (embora menores do que os níveis pré-crise). Enquanto isso, as negociações comerciais na Ronda de Doha atingiram um impasse, gerando incertezas sobre o futuro da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) como um fórum de negociação. Nessas circunstâncias, o sistema deve repensar seu processo de tomada de decisão baseado na predominância dos Estados membros, o princípio do consenso e a noção de compromisso único, como alguns críticos sugeriram? E, em caso afirmativo, como tal agenda de reformas poderia ser iniciada na OMC? Além disso, além da função de negociação da OMC, a paralisia do sistema também levanta questões urgentes sobre a capacidade do sistema para responder aos desafios urgentes de nossos tempos, como o comércio e as mudanças climáticas, ou a segurança alimentar e a volatilidade dos preços.

Termos de indexação.

Palavras-chave temáticas e # 160 ;:

Palavras-chave institucionais e # 160 ;:

Texto completo.

"O que estamos vendo hoje é a paralisia na função de negociação da OMC, seja no acesso ao mercado ou na elaboração de regras. O que enfrentamos é a incapacidade da OMC de se adaptar e se adaptar às prioridades emergentes do comércio global, que você não pode resolver através de acordos bilaterais. '

Pascal Lamy, em uma reunião informal de chefes de delegação da.

Comitê de Negociação Comercial, 26 de julho de 2018.

1. Introdução.

1 A crise financeira de 2008-2009 e a atual crise da dívida soberana na Europa não só destacou o alto nível de interdependências econômicas existentes em todo o mundo, mas também os desafios crescentes na busca de ações colaborativas internacionais para enfrentar desafios urgentes de desenvolvimento sustentável. Em um mundo multipolar em rápida mudança em que a riqueza econômica está se movendo progressivamente para o Oriente e o Sul, e em que as restrições de recursos se tornaram cada vez mais prementes, a cooperação internacional continua em crise. O surgimento de países emergentes como a China, a Índia ou o Brasil e o relativo declínio dos poderes econômicos tradicionais criaram novas oportunidades, como reflete o crescimento sem precedentes no comércio Sul-Sul observado ao longo da última década. No entanto, também gerou novas tensões, principalmente entre países com grandes excedentes comerciais e aqueles com déficits comerciais crescentes. Tais tensões são igualmente palatáveis ​​nas negociações internacionais, como as que tratam das mudanças climáticas.

2 Enquanto isso, estima-se que o número de pessoas famintas atingiu um bilhão em 2009, catapultando a segurança alimentar de volta ao topo da agenda política. Como o crescimento da demanda continua a aumentar mais rapidamente do que o aumento da oferta - devido fundamentalmente ao baixo crescimento da produtividade - espera-se que os preços dos alimentos permaneçam altos e voláteis nos próximos anos. Vários fatores contribuíram para aumentar a volatilidade dos preços: baixos estoques resultantes de uma sucessão de déficits de produção relacionados com o clima, demanda crescente de matérias-primas para biocombustíveis, aumento dos preços da energia e depreciação do dólar norte-americano; No entanto, estes foram agravados por respostas políticas, tais como restrições de exportação.

3 Este ambiente em rápida mutação e as urgentes necessidades de ação cooperativa internacional para resolver as preocupações em torno da segurança alimentar, mudanças climáticas ou desequilíbrios comerciais insustentáveis ​​contrastam fortemente com a paralisia atual do sistema multilateral de comércio. A Rodada de Doha de negociações comerciais no âmbito da Organização Mundial do Comércio (OMC) permaneceu em um limbo por vários meses sem perspectivas reais para o futuro próximo. Enquanto vários fatores explicam o impasse nas negociações comerciais de dez anos, essa paralisia suscita incertezas sobre o futuro do sistema comercial multilateral.

4 Como contribuição para esta discussão, este capítulo analisa a forma como o sistema de comércio multilateral procurou abordar os objetivos da política pública global e como isso pode ser feito no futuro. Após uma breve revisão das tendências atuais no comércio internacional e os desenvolvimentos recentes que levaram à atual crise na Rodada de Doha, a Seção 3 considera possíveis opções para reformar a forma como a OMC conduz negociações. Finalmente, a Seção 4 se concentra em como a OMC procurou responder a objetivos específicos de políticas públicas no passado - usando o caso da segurança alimentar como exemplo - e o que isso nos diz sobre a forma como o sistema comercial multilateral se relaciona com o público global global metas políticas.

2. O contexto internacional.

2.1 Tendências recentes no comércio internacional.

5 Após uma queda acentuada de 12% em 2009, o volume de exportações mundiais de mercadorias aumentou em 14,5 por cento em 2018, permitindo que o comércio mundial se recuperasse até os níveis anteriores à crise. Esse número, o maior desde que a coleta de dados começou em 1950, acompanhou um aumento de 3,6% no produto interno bruto global (PIB). De acordo com a OMC (OMC, 2018a), o crescimento do comércio mundial deve se situar em um 5,8 por cento mais modesto em 2018, com um aumento de 2,5% no PIB global (ver Figura 9.1). Sem pressa, a Ásia exibiu o crescimento mais rápido das exportações reais - 23,1% -, com exportações chinesas e japonesas crescendo 28,4 e 27,5%, respectivamente. Enquanto isso, o comércio de mercadorias cresceu 10,8 por cento na Europa e 15,4 por cento nos EUA. Em geral, os países em desenvolvimento e as economias em transição representaram 45% das exportações mundiais totais, a maior participação de sempre (OMC, 2018a).

6 O aumento dos preços das commodities e uma depreciação da moeda dos EUA significaram que o crescimento do comércio em dólares - em 22% - excedeu o aumento em termos de volume. Em particular, as regiões que dependem das exportações de recursos naturais - como a África, o Oriente Médio ou a América do Sul - experimentaram um menor crescimento nos volumes comerciais, mas um aumento significativo no valor em dólares de suas exportações. As exportações africanas cresceram 6,5 por cento em termos de volume, mas em 28 por cento em dólares. Da mesma forma, as exportações latino-americanas cresceram apenas 6,2% em termos de volume, mas 25% em dólares (OMC, 2018b).

Figura 9.1 - Exportações mundiais de mercadorias e PIB, 2008-11 (em variação percentual *)

* Variação percentual em relação ao mesmo mês do ano anterior.

Fonte: OMC (2018b).

7 Enquanto isso, de acordo com a Conferência das Nações Unidas sobre Comércio e Desenvolvimento (UNCTAD), o total de investimentos estrangeiros diretos (IDE) aumentou de US $ 1,185 para 1,244 trilhões em 2018, em grande parte devido ao aumento do fluxo para os países em desenvolvimento que, juntamente com as economias de transição, contabilizaram por mais da metade do FDI total (UNCTAD, 2018). O IED externo das economias emergentes também atingiu níveis recordes, com a maior parte do investimento direcionado para outros países do Sul.

8 Embora esses números pareçam impressionantes, o aumento no comércio de mercadorias em 2018 não bastava retornar as exportações para níveis compatíveis com as tendências de 1990-2008. Na frente do investimento, apesar de um aumento de 5% em relação a 2009, os fluxos globais de IDE permaneceram abaixo da média pré-crise (2005-07) e 37% abaixo do seu pico de 2007 (UNCTAD, 2018). E enquanto as economias emergentes da América Latina e do Sudeste Asiático experimentaram um rápido crescimento, os fluxos de IDE continuaram a ser contratados em países desenvolvidos, África e Ásia do Sul.

9 De um modo mais geral, como a produção mundial em 2009 foi deprimida, a OMC argumenta que um crescimento mais elevado em 2018 era esperado, particularmente porque o crescimento do PIB geralmente atingia 4 por cento ou mais nos últimos anos (OMC, 2018a). Vários fatores podem explicar por que o comércio e a produção cresceram mais lentamente do que poderiam ter. Em 2018, os preços do petróleo relativamente elevados aumentaram os custos de energia para as famílias e os negócios. As altas taxas de desemprego também afetaram o consumo doméstico e a demanda de importação em países desenvolvidos. Finalmente, as tentativas na Europa, nos EUA e em outros países para reduzir os déficits orçamentários levaram a cortes nos gastos e receita, prejudicando as perspectivas de crescimento a curto prazo. Os impactos negativos da crise financeira e da recessão global são, portanto, susceptíveis de permanecerem por algum tempo, apesar da recuperação recorde do comércio em 2018.

10 Nos EUA, uma baixa taxa de poupança nacional e alto consumo privado como parte do PIB continuaram a sustentar a demanda por bens de consumo importados, alimentando o rápido crescimento das exportações nas economias emergentes. Ao longo dos últimos 10 a 15 anos, esses desenvolvimentos resultaram em grandes desequilíbrios, com déficits de contas correntes importantes acumulados nos EUA em particular e grandes excedentes de contas correntes em outros, principalmente a China, a Alemanha e o Japão. Estes, por sua vez, geraram tensões políticas, evidentes na controvérsia entre os EUA e a China sobre as políticas cambiais. Em 2018, os desequilíbrios comerciais permaneceram menores do que os níveis anteriores à crise, mas para a maioria dos países, exceto a China, a diferença entre as exportações e as importações aumentou em relação a 2009 (ver figuras 9.3 e 9.4). Como mostra a Figura 9.2, o déficit comercial dos EUA aumentou de cerca de US $ 550 bilhões para US $ 690 bilhões - mas manteve-se abaixo dos US $ 880 bilhões observados em 2008. Enquanto isso, o superávit comercial da China caiu de quase US $ 300 bilhões em 2008 para pouco mais de US $ 180 bilhões em 2018. Em 2018, o déficit comercial da União Européia (UE) aumentou para além dos níveis de 2009, apesar do superávit comercial da Alemanha de US $ 200 bilhões, embora o déficit geral da UE tenha sido menor que em 2008. O Japão foi uma exceção à tendência geral para menores desequilíbrios, já que o seu superávit comercial quase quadruplicou em 2018 em relação aos níveis anteriores à crise.

11 Há consenso generalizado de que os desequilíbrios atuais não são sustentáveis ​​a longo prazo. Os níveis persistentemente elevados de consumo familiar doméstico financiado pela dívida nos EUA terão que retornar a níveis históricos ligeiramente mais baixos (Mayer, 2018). Ao mesmo tempo, as baixas taxas de consumo e a alta poupança nacional na China provocaram pedidos para Pequim para desenvolver seu mercado interno e passar gradualmente de investimentos e exportações para o crescimento liderado pelo consumidor. Essas tendências provavelmente afetarão o tamanho e a composição da demanda global nos próximos anos. Isso ocorre em parte porque o aumento do consumo chinês pode não compensar totalmente uma possível redução do crescimento da demanda dos EUA, mas também porque as duas economias tendem a importar diferentes cestos de produtos, com a China comprando mais matérias-primas, commodities e alimentos, por exemplo. A menos que outros países com excedentes comerciais, como a Alemanha ou o Japão, também aumentem o consumo doméstico, as mudanças na demanda global terão grandes repercussões negativas nas exportações dos países em desenvolvimento e também no emprego - particularmente em setores industriais como têxteis e roupas (Mayer, 2018).

Figura 9.2 - Desequilíbrios comerciais em economias selecionadas, 2008-10 (em US $ milhões)

Fonte: OMC (2018b).

12 O comércio Sul-Sul também continuou a expandir-se e agora representa cerca de 50% das exportações dos países em desenvolvimento. Os volumes comerciais da África com seus parceiros emergentes duplicaram em valor nominal ao longo da década e agora representam 37% do comércio total do continente (AFDB et al., 2018). Enquanto a China representa o principal parceiro emergente de África, tendo superado os EUA em termos de volume, a soma do comércio do continente com seus outros parceiros emergentes (como a Turquia, Brasil, Coréia e Índia) é agora ainda maior do que o comércio com a China. Embora estes desenvolvimentos ofereçam novas oportunidades - mercados de exportação, transferência de tecnologia, ajuda e outras formas de cooperação - as exportações africanas para outros países em desenvolvimento permanecem concentradas em produtos primários, com poucas evidências até agora que o comércio Sul-Sul provocou uma transformação estrutural real.

Figura 9.3 - Importações-exportações: EUA e China, 2005-11 (em US $ milhões)

Figura 9.4 - Importações-exportações: Alemanha e UE, 2005-11 (em US $ milhões)

2.2 O colapso das negociações da Rodada de Doha.

14 Desde janeiro de 2018, a Rodada de Doha continuou a se aproximar, com prazos para concluir as negociações de dez anos perdidas no final desse ano e a próxima, e agora não tem fim à vista. Ao longo do ano, os EUA repetidamente pediram a participação obrigatória em acordos "setoriais" para produtos manufaturados, devido a tarifas reduzidas em toda uma indústria. O Brasil, a China e a Índia rejeitaram as exigências dos EUA para que as principais economias emergentes assumissem responsabilidades específicas e contestaram a afirmação de Washington de que os textos de dezembro de 2008 penalizam desproporcionalmente os EUA - chamando os EUA para esclarecer quais as concessões específicas que Washington poderia oferecer em troca do aumento Acesso ao mercado.

15 Enquanto isso, o grupo de países em desenvolvimento do G-33 fez uma série de propostas a favor de um "mecanismo de salvaguarda especial" forte que eles poderiam usar para defender os produtores domésticos domésticos de surtos repentinos de importações ou depressões de preços. Os EUA e outros países exportadores continuaram a insistir em que as flexibilidades dos países em desenvolvimento não devem prejudicar o crescimento do comércio normal.

16 Depois de um "exercício de inventário" em março 2018 muito popular e infrutífero, os membros se reuniram durante a maior parte do ano restante em vários grupos bilaterais e plurilaterais informais - descritos como "geometria variável" pelo diretor-geral da OMC, Pascal Lamy. O comércio também aparece em discussões à margem de encontros da Organização de Cooperação e Desenvolvimento Econômico (OCDE) e Cooperação Econômica Ásia-Pacífico (APEC), e na agenda das cúpulas de Toronto e Seul do grupo G-20 das principais economias - apenas para os funcionários acharem que os interesses dos principais poderes comerciais ainda não eram suficientemente próximos para que um acordo de Doha fosse atingido no futuro próximo. No início de 2018, o México e o Brasil apresentaram propostas separadas sobre a quebra do impasse de Doha, incluindo possíveis trade-offs entre áreas de negociação separadas, como a agricultura e os bens manufaturados. Contudo, estes achavam pouco apoio ao organismo de comércio global. Reconhecendo que as lacunas eram cada vez mais difíceis de superar, negociadores comerciais começaram a discutir opções para um "pouso suave". O lançamento de textos revisados ​​ou documentos de trabalho em abril de 2018 confirmou os receios de que o progresso tenha bloqueado, com algumas cadeiras de grupo de negociação apenas capazes de lançar relatórios "state of play" em vez de novos rascunhos.

17 Membros então começaram a conversar silenciosamente sobre o que um "Plano B" poderia parecer. O plano foi oficialmente anunciado em maio: os membros finalizariam um mini-pacote focado nas preocupações dos países menos desenvolvidos (PMA) para a ministra de dezembro, e também estabelecem um plano de trabalho para resolver outras questões pendentes. Com a insistência dos EUA, o pacote foi ampliado para incluir questões que não sejam LDC também. No entanto, o pacote rapidamente começou a desvendar, já que os membros não conseguiram concordar sobre quais itens de PMA e não-PMA incluirem. O consenso revelou-se indescritível nas quatro principais questões que os PMA procuraram incluir: acesso isento de contingentes para suas exportações; uma renúncia aos serviços dos PMA, um "passo em frente" sobre o algodão e regras de origem melhoradas. Da mesma forma, os poderes comerciais não conseguiram chegar a acordo sobre o crescente número de questões "não-PMA" propostas, que vão desde subsídios à pesca até a facilitação do comércio e a concorrência de exportação.

18 Em agosto, o plano para a ministração de dezembro de 2018 havia se afastado de produzir um pacote LDC-plus: os membros, em vez disso, decidiram que se concentrariam em questões não-Doha e em um plano de trabalho pós-dezembro para a conclusão de Doha, mantendo discussões paralelas sobre possíveis produtos entre os países menos desenvolvidos.

3. Governança comercial global justa e inclusiva.

19 Vários fatores explicam a incapacidade dos membros de concluir as negociações comerciais. Alguns apontam para o fato de que o processo de negociação tornou-se muito politizado e complexo, dada a crescente diversidade e expectativas variadas da adesão de 153 países da OMC. Outros culpam o surgimento de economias emergentes, como Brasil, China e Índia, juntamente com coalizões de países em desenvolvimento mais assertivas. Outros ainda o ligam à crise financeira global e a recentes dificuldades domésticas na UE e nos EUA que impediram esses países de exercerem plenamente o papel de liderança nas negociações da OMC. Finalmente, as posições dos países e os interesses de negociação mudaram ao longo do tempo, refletindo a dinâmica geopolítica de hoje em dia. Todos esses fatores são relevantes, mas os críticos estão cada vez mais apontando para uma falha mais fundamental no sistema, que se relaciona com a maneira como as negociações são conduzidas. Alguns observadores argumentaram que uma reforma profunda do sistema é necessária para superar a paralisia atual.

Outros 20 observam que não são necessariamente os procedimentos institucionais da OMC que paralisaram a organização, mas sim a forma como os membros escolheram usar suas regras e práticas (Rodriguez Mendoza e Wilke, 2018, Rolland, 2018). Na verdade, alguns especialistas argumentam que a OMC serviu de modelo de sistema de governança a nível internacional, principalmente devido ao seu sistema de solução de controvérsias automático e exigível. Além disso, através de seu conjunto de regras e disciplinas, argumenta-se, a OMC também tem sido bem sucedida na prevenção de tendências protecionistas durante a crise econômica.

1 O relatório Warwick, por exemplo, fornece uma das ações mais notáveis ​​e abrangentes e (.)

21 No entanto, o debate sobre a reforma institucional - se é necessário, em que forma e através de qual tipo de processo - continuou desde que a OMC foi estabelecida pela primeira vez (Deere-Birbeck e Monagle, 2009). Em 2003, após o fracasso da Conferência Ministerial de Cancún, Pascal Lamy - então comissário de comércio da UE - qualificou a OMC como "medieval" e pediu que seu processo de decisão fosse reformulado (Lamy, 2003). Nos últimos anos, vários atores propuseram reformar praticamente todos os aspectos do funcionamento da OMC - desde a gestão e administração até a condução das negociações comerciais e da solução de controvérsias, até a capacitação e cooperação com outras instituições ou o público em geral (Deere-Birbeck e Monagle, 2009). Os objetivos por trás dessas propostas e o ritmo das reformas propostas foram igualmente diversos, passando de melhorias incrementais para mudanças radicais na forma como a instituição funciona. Embora algumas propostas tenham sido introduzidas pelos governos, outros foram promovidos pela academia, institutos de pesquisa, sociedade civil e outras organizações internacionais.1 O sistema multilateral em si não tem sido estático diante dessas demandas. Reformas - ou mudanças incrementais - aconteceram em várias frentes, inclusive no nível gerencial, na transparência externa, na participação pública em processos de resolução de litígios ou na forma como as negociações são conduzidas (Deere-Birbeck e Monagle, 2009). No entanto, há opiniões divergentes sobre a desejabilidade e o impacto dessas mudanças e sobre se elas estão longe o suficiente.

2 Quando os governos lançaram as negociações comerciais do Uruguay Round no âmbito do GATT em 1986, o decl ()

22 O debate suscitou interesse renovado enquanto membros preparados para a Reunião Ministerial de novembro de 2009. Após dez anos de negociações complexas, caracterizadas por prazos perdidos e poucos dividendos substantivos, as críticas argumentaram que as regras estabelecidas, os princípios e as práticas de tomada de decisão estabelecidos pelo Acordo Geral sobre Tarifas e Comércio (GATT), são simplesmente inadequada para os rápidos desafios do nosso tempo. Alguns argumentam que o "triângulo de ouro" do GATT / OMC - o domínio das partes contratantes, o princípio do consenso e a lógica do "empreendimento único" - é incapaz de enfrentar os desafios da governança comercial mundial moderna (Cottier e Elsig, 2009).

23 O fortalecimento do funcionamento da negociação da OMC exigirá o equilíbrio de três demandas concorrentes: maior eficiência na condução das negociações; legitimidade reforçada, inclusive por uma melhor abordagem das preocupações com as políticas públicas; e maior inclusão, de modo a superar as assimetrias de poder e promover resultados mutuamente benéficos. As seções a seguir analisam algumas das críticas e as opções de reforma propostas para a condução das negociações da OMC à luz desses objetivos.

3.1 Os princípios do consenso e do compromisso único.

3 O princípio do consenso remonta à Organização Internacional do Comércio (ITO) e com ele (.) 4 'Com a exceção das melhorias e esclarecimentos do ESD, a conduta, a conclusão e ()

24 As negociações da OMC são orientadas pelo princípio do consenso e pela ideia de que representam uma única empresa. O consenso não é interpretado como exigindo unanimidade; no entanto, 3 se nenhum objeto presente do estado membro, o consenso é assumido. O compromisso único, por outro lado, exige que todas as áreas sejam negociadas e adotadas por todas as partes ao mesmo tempo. Ambos os princípios derivam diretamente da natureza da OMC como uma organização dirigida pelos membros. Com o secretariado assumindo um papel quase marginal e o princípio do consenso com base na igualdade soberana que permeia todas as áreas e funções da organização, a predominância das partes contratantes é a principal característica.

25 Cada conceito pode ser visto como uma espada de dois gumes. O princípio do consenso é importante para os países em desenvolvimento, uma vez que, em teoria, garante que cada membro pode vetar quaisquer decisões, independentemente do seu poder político ou econômico. O empreendimento único, por outro lado, tem apoiado os países em desenvolvimento em várias ocasiões, por exemplo, quando um grupo de membros latino-americanos parou o estabelecimento da OMC até que certas concessões de interesse vital para os países em desenvolvimento tenham sido feitas (Croome, 1995).

26 Ambos os pilares, no entanto, precisam ser vistos no contexto das assimetrias de poder abrangentes na OMC. Na prática, as nações mais ricas podem manter as conversas comerciais como refém com mais facilidade do que as mais pobres, pelo fato de que elas são mais capazes de resistir à pressão política para se juntar a um consenso mesmo contra a grande oposição (Steinberg, 2002; Cottier e Elsig, 2009; Low, 2009). O princípio do consenso é, portanto, menos sobre a adoção consensual atual de uma decisão final do que sobre o processo de construção de consenso (Ismail e Vickers, 2018). As maiores nações comerciais, portanto, têm uma responsabilidade especial em ajudar os países a chegarem a um acordo orientando o processo de consenso e facilitando uma atmosfera de compromisso. Ismail e Vickers observam assim que, na rodada de Doha, "os países desenvolvidos também compartilham uma culpa considerável - mesmo a responsabilidade - por frustrar o processo de construção de consenso. É [...] perturbador que os críticos do princípio do consenso suscitam preocupações com a eficiência apenas quando os países em desenvolvimento menores e as economias emergentes maiores (por exemplo, Brasil, China, Índia e África do Sul) não se juntam ao consenso dos países desenvolvidos "(Ismail e Vickers, 2018).

27 Isso também é verdade para o empreendimento único e o uso de "vínculos" para condicionar concessões em uma área para progredir em outros. Enquanto, em princípio, isso poderia promover compromissos, concentrando a atenção dos negociadores nos maiores ganhos, na prática os membros tendem a enfatizar demais as perdas (Van Grasstek e Sauvé, 2006). Isto é particularmente verdadeiro para a rodada atual, onde os negociadores não procuram estabelecer vínculos sistematicamente com vista a obter benefícios a longo prazo, mas concentram-se em alcançar ganhos a curto prazo por razões táticas (Rodriguez Mendoza e Wilke, 2018). A introdução de vínculos impede que determinadas áreas avancem independentemente do progresso em outros. Como resultado, mesmo pequenas promoções não podem ser alcançadas, pois novas propostas sugerem novas ligações.

28 As propostas para reformar esses dois principais princípios de negociação (Deere-Birbeck e Monagle, 2009) podem ser resumidas em duas categorias: as que introduzem diferentes sistemas de votação e os relacionados aos "acordos de geometria variável", incluindo os chamados "plurilaterais" e "críticos". acordos de massa ".

5 Observe que a votação ponderada no Banco Mundial e no Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) é baseada em (.)

29 Propostas sobre votação ponderada (uma sugestão para reformar o princípio do consenso) e os acordos de massa crítica compartilham uma idéia comum. O poder - seja ele para votar, a definição da agenda ou a participação nas negociações - refletiria o significado econômico de um país. A alocação de votos poderia assim refletir a participação de um país no comércio global, PIB ou o nível de abertura do mercado. Alguns especialistas também sugerem levar em consideração o tamanho ou a população do país, argumentando que isso garantiria que o poder seja compartilhado de forma justa entre países desenvolvidos, emergentes e outros países em desenvolvimento (Cottier e Takenoshita, 2008; Elsig, 2009). No entanto, a experiência com abordagens de votação ponderada no Fundo Monetário Internacional (FMI) e no Banco Mundial mostra que a abordagem pode facilmente manifestar as assimetrias de poder real em vez de superar os desequilíbrios (Warwick Commission, 2007) .5.

30 O sistema de votação atual não sofre de um grande grupo de países pequenos que bloqueiam as negociações, mas sim de um punhado de países poderosos que não conseguem chegar a um acordo entre eles. A alternativa, um voto de maioria simples, poderia ser difícil de introduzir, pois isso prejudicaria a posição atualmente poderosa dos países desenvolvidos ao permitir que grupos de países menores os anulassem. A experiência na Assembléia Geral das Nações Unidas (ONU) indica que muitos países se opõem sistematicamente à introdução de uma maioria simples (Anghie, 2005).

31 O conceito de acordos de "geometria variável" é uma alternativa ao empreendimento único. Os acordos plurilaterais, por exemplo, já foram utilizados no passado. Aqui, a participação de todos os membros da OMC não é necessária para chegar a um acordo e os membros interessados ​​são livres para participar da negociação ou não. Vários especialistas sugeriram revivir e aprimorar essa abordagem (Conselho Consultivo, 2004, Elsig, 2008). A "abordagem de massa" crítica é ligeiramente diferente no sentido de que exige que os membros participantes representem pelo menos uma massa crítica ou um certo limiar de um setor em negociação com base em seu nível coletivo de atividade econômica, produção, consumo ou exportação (Jackson, 2001). Os apoiantes argumentam que a inclusão da quota de importação no limiar asseguraria que acordos exportadores de massa não pudessem ser mal utilizados pelos exportadores para harmonizar seus sistemas de exportação em detrimento dos importadores - uma questão que eles consideram de importância crescente, como, por exemplo, os países produtores de tecnologia enfrentam escassez de matérias-primas necessárias que são extraídas em apenas um punhado de países (ICTSD, 2018d). Os limiares propostos variam de 75 a 90 por cento. Os defensores argumentam que o limiar poderia ser adicionado ao requisito de incluir pelo menos um número mínimo de países. Se construído de forma sensível, sugerem sugerentes, esse segundo requisito poderia garantir a legitimidade de uma massa crítica particular e não apenas sua eficiência. A Comissão Warwick, por exemplo, observa que "um benefício positivo para o bem-estar global, para proteger o princípio da não discriminação e para acomodar explicitamente os efeitos da distribuição de renda da elaboração de regras" deveria ser parte de uma consideração de massa crítica, em particular "quando se relaciona com a formação de uma agenda" (Warwick Commission, 2007, 3).

32 Deve ser advertido, no entanto, que a maioria das propostas para uma abordagem de massa crítica se concentre nas negociações sobre modalidades e concessões "a jusante" (basicamente acesso ao mercado), limitando assim limiares a considerações puramente econômicas. À medida que a OMC se move para abordar uma maior variedade de políticas relacionadas ao comércio, tal conceito de massa crítica pode ser inadequado. Os países pequenos, por exemplo, podem não ter uma determinada participação comercial de exportação ou importação em um determinado setor e, portanto, não são indispensáveis ​​para uma massa crítica, mas serão criticamente afetados por quaisquer novas regras - seja isso em produtos agrícolas ou nova regulamentação sobre comércio de serviços. Isto é particularmente verdadeiro à medida que as "tendências na elaboração de regras" servem cada vez mais como referência para a interpretação legal e as novas abordagens reguladoras são usadas como referência e argumento em negociações não relacionadas ainda assim. Cada negociação é, portanto, também sobre a formação de políticas globais e tendências de direito.

6 'Os acordos e os instrumentos jurídicos associados incluídos no Anexo 4 (a seguir designado "(.)

Outro aspecto que continua a ser contestado entre os defensores de uma abordagem de massa crítica é o caráter de "nação mais favorecida" (MFN) dos acordos finais. Os acordos atuais plurilaterais da OMC (onde nenhuma massa crítica era necessária) só se aplicam entre os membros que os assinaram.6 Se for fortalecido, essa abordagem pode transformar a OMC em uma organização de guarda-chuva que facilita os arranjos de grupo, ao mesmo tempo que perde sua participação multilateral e, portanto, participativa. e caráter inclusivo. Para atender a essa preocupação, propostas alternativas sugerem ampliar os direitos e benefícios decorrentes de acordos críticos de massa em regime NMF a todos os membros da OMC (Warwick Commission, 2007). Isso poderia preservar o caráter multilateral da OMC e, portanto, sua integridade, ao mesmo tempo em que apoia negociações rápidas.

34 No entanto, mesmo a última construção levanta certas questões. Em primeiro lugar, assumindo que um determinado setor era irrelevante para um determinado país no momento em que uma negociação crítica de massa foi concluída, ainda não está claro como o país poderia ser induzido a aderir ao acordo se os benefícios já se aplicam em uma base NMF. Além disso, não está claro se um país seria obrigado a aderir ao acordo existente ou se haveria uma opção para renegociar os termos (Harbinson, 2009). Se nenhuma alteração fosse permitida, grupos poderosos agora poderiam concluir acordos que se tornem relevantes para os países em desenvolvimento apenas em uma fase posterior, impondo assim indiretamente seus termos e condições. As críticas a respeito de uma tendência para compromissos na OMC nos ALCs e o medo do Acordo de Comércio Anti-Falsificação (ACTA) que introduzem um novo ponto de referência global para a proteção da propriedade intelectual levam em conta a este respeito (ICTSD, 2008b).

3.2 Redirecionar o domínio dos Estados membros.

35 While some of the proposals discussed above might be promising, neither a review of the voting procedures nor a critical mass approach in isolation of other reforms seem to have the potential to fully achieve the three objectives of WTO reform, namely, efficiency, legitimacy and inclusiveness. Instead, if implemented in their simplest form, both concepts risk excluding smaller countries and exacerbating power asymmetries. Also, none of the proposed reforms would be likely to resolve the current deadlock in the Doha round which results, to a large extent, from political differences rather than weak procedural rules. In this respect, some critics have challenged the ‘member-driven’ nature of the institution. They argue that a stronger WTO secretariat could be useful, particularly in times where members fail to initiate needed deliberations or where discussions are paralysed by individual member states’ political actions. ‘If members are not prepared to defend and promote the principles they subscribed to, then the Secretariat must be free to do so’, the Sutherland report noted already in 2004 (Consultative Board, 2004).

7 See for instance the 2003 ‘Memorandum on the Need to Improve Internal Transparency and Participati (. )

36 Such proposals, however, need to be seen in the light of already existing criticism over a too powerful and partial WTO secretariat. The same stakeholders fear that strengthening the secretariat could create a strong institution following its own internal agenda.7 Consequentially, the challenge would be a strong, yet neutral secretariat. Proponents agree that this could only be guaranteed if member states were to ensure a constant participation and oversight. Efforts on strengthening the secretariat would thus focus primarily on increased political support by member states rather than a budgetary increase or a mandate extension as advocated by others. The idea behind this is to redirect but not replace the preponderant role of member states, i. e. to strengthen the WTO through increased policy deliberation among its members.

8 For instance, during the 7th Ministerial Conference in 2009, the delegation of Uruguay called upon (. )

37 One important starting point could be the election process of the Director General (Consultative Board, 2004; Steger, 2009). This process provides a critical opportunity to reflect on the most pressing challenges facing the organisation. If candidates were to take a strong position while countries provided them with clear indications on what is expected over the coming term, directors would receive a strong mandate to lead and guide even in critical times (Deere-Birbeck and Monagle, 2009, 74). The current practice of ‘nodding through’ rather than ‘electing’ a new Director General, without any internal and external reflection process, on the other hand, weakens the position of the Director General, the member states and the WTO as an institution (Keohane and Nye, 2000). A second point of entry could be the regular Ministerial Conferences. If members used the meetings to reflect on the standing of the WTO, the way forward and the actions expected in the coming years, the secretariat could guide the organisation accordingly over the coming months. In fact Ministerial Conferences were originally meant to provide for such a forum. Only with the launch of the Doha Round they have turned into pure negotiation gatherings. Numerous developing countries have consistently criticised this development.8.

3.3. Forum and process.

38 As described above, there has been no shortage of thoughtful ideas and recommendations from a variety of different sources and study groups. But some critics argue that these ideas have gone nowhere because they have had no process to feed into. Currently only one set of proposals is being discussed in a formalised manner at the WTO, namely those related to dispute settlement (WTO, 1999b). As foreseen by the original WTO agreements a special session of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) has been reviewing related reform proposals since 1997. Formally it proceeds outside of the Doha Round and is not part of the single undertaking. In practice, however, the review is used as a trade-off opportunity in the Doha Round which has prevented any conclusion over the last 14 years. To allow for a proper debate, other reform proposals will also need to be addressed in a formalised process at the WTO. Such a process would probably need to involve and engage trade ministers themselves to generate sufficient credibility and political traction. Ideally, the process should be co-chaired and co-owned by a developing and a developed country trade minister.

39 At the same time, the experience of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) review shows that any reform discussion must be de-linked from trade negotiations. Enforcing such an objective and non-concession-based discussion could be easier if various reform proposals were debated in a joint forum with a common objective and a single plan of action. Moreover, a joint process would facilitate the coordination of different reforms ensuring that the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the WTO do not develop in opposite directions but are mutually supportive.

40 A first opportunity to initiate such a process was missed at the 7th Ministerial Conference, in December 2009, essentially due to a lack of political will to push this agenda through. During the preparatory process and under the leadership of India, 18 developed and developing countries had proposed to address the need for an institutional reform in a formalised and long-term manner. The coalition, backed by almost the entire WTO membership, called upon the WTO to ‘[…] periodically engage in a process of review of its functioning, efficiency and transparency’ and upon the member states ‘[to] consider systemic improvements, as appropriate. […] to establish an appropriate deliberative process to review the organization’s functioning, efficiency and transparency and consider possible improvements, while bearing in mind the high priority […] attach[ed] to the successful conclusion of the DDA [Doha Development Agenda] negotiation’ (WTO, 2009).

41 However, the proposal was dropped from consideration following opposition from Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Venezuela ( ICTSD , 2009) . An earlier communication submitted by India in summer 2009, entitled ‘Strengthening the WTO’, likewise remained without further consideration ( Deere-Birbeck, 2009) . These missed opportunities further aggravate the dilemma of the WTO as political guidance becomes hampered at the very first stage ( Deere-Birbeck, 2009) . If the secretariat assumed a more active role in preparing ministerial conferences and guiding towards processes as those called upon by the country coalition, initial opposition might be overcome. As a formal forum for discussing reform proposals continues to be missing, this could be the first step towards reform.

4. The WTO and global public policy goals: the example of food security.

42 Beyond institutional reform, the current paralysis in the Doha Round is affecting the ability of the system to address pressing global challenges. Over the last 17 years, public perceptions of the organisation’s relevance and legitimacy have greatly depended on the degree to which it can credibly claim to be responding effectively to broader public policy demands in areas such as food security, environmental protection, labour standards and, more recently, the transition towards a low-carbon economy. However, the difficulty the WTO has experienced in bringing its troubled Doha Round talks to a successful conclusion is arguably hampering its ability to respond and adapt meaningfully to new public policy challenges.

43 From its inception in 1994 as an organisation outside the UN system, the WTO has consistently been obliged to demonstrate that its decision-making processes, rules and negotiating outcomes are consistent with broader public policy goals – in the areas of health, the environment or development, to name but a few. While calls for greater policy coherence have often come from the governments that constitute the membership of the global trade body, they have also come from civil society groups, the media and even from other intergovernmental agencies concerned with the relationship between trade and public policy objectives.

9 Policies directed at ensuring food security certainly reach beyond the trade arena. Investment in (. )

44 The evolution in the way in which food security concerns are addressed at the WTO can serve to illustrate the organisation’s attempt to take wider public policy goals into account.9 It also demonstrates the challenges that remain in establishing policy coherence with other global governance mechanisms, and in responding to the scale and ambition of the aspirations and commitments that governments have agreed to in the post-war period (United Nations General Assembly, 1948, art. 25; 1 966, art. 11; 2000, goal 1) (FAO, 1996, para. 2).

45 At the global level, evolving consumption patterns, combined with demographic changes, urbanisation and low agricultural productivity growth, are widely expected to mean that regional and international trade will play an increased role in many developing countries’ food security strategies. Combined with increased investment in agriculture, international trade mighthelp offset future climate-induced production decreases in certain regions, ensuring that local populations can purchase food that may be unavailable in sufficient quantities through domestic production.

10 ‘Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficie (. )

46 Two years before the 1996 World Food Summit agreed on a landmark definition10 of food security that is still widely used and accepted today, the concept was mentioned in the preamble to the Agreement on Agriculture at the end of the Uruguay Round, and in some paragraphs within the text of the accord. These included provisions dealing with export prohibitions and restrictions (article 12), subsidies for public stockholding for food security purposes (Annex 2, para. 3) and a clause permitting exemptions to be made from market access binding and reduction commitments (Annex 5, para. 1d). However, while food security is also related to numerous other aspects of the agreement, such as subsidy reform or market access considerations, it is not explicitly mentioned anywhere else in the text.

11 See, for example, proposals from the developing country ‘Like Minded Group’ (23 June 2000), G/AG/N (. )

47 As governments concluded the Agreement on Agriculture, they also finalised the Marrakech Decision (WTO, 1999c) on least developed and net-food importing developing countries, supposedly intended to ensure that these countries would remain able to purchase food from external sources ‘on reasonable terms and conditions’. The decision has since been widely criticised by developing countries, who have argued that loopholes in the text prevent them from requiring developed countries and the international financial institutions to implement its provisions.11 Essentially, the decision characterises the challenge that net food-importing countries could face as a trade and balance-of-payments problem rather than a food security problem, and provides a fairly limited set of solutions centring mainly on the provision of food aid.

48 Arguably, the way in which food security concerns have been approached in the multilateral trading system has evolved considerably since the end of the Uruguay Round, along with the way in which other public policy goals have been treated. In the years running up to the 2001 Doha ministerial conference, developing country governments expressed growing concern that they were ill-equipped to implement the Uruguay Round agreements, that the provisions of these agreements undermined domestic food security, or – as in the case of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) – that they had signed on to texts which affected their food security without fully understanding the practical and legal implications that might result. In some cases, these concerns were also echoed by development agencies and campaign groups, farmers’ organisations, research centres, academic experts and the staff of various intergovernmental organisations.

12 Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Pakistan, Haiti, Nicaragua, Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka (. ) 13 India (15 January 2001), G/AG/NG/W/102, wto/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd02_p(. ) 14 Domestic support measures that are exempt from reduction commitments on the basis that they cause (. )

49 In the summer following the WTO’s Seattle ministerial conference in 1999, a cross-regional group of 11 developing countries known as the Like-Minded Group submitted a proposal12 for a ‘development box’, under the built-in agenda of negotiations foreseen in article 20 of the Agreement on Agriculture. The sponsors called for a development box that would aim to ‘increase food security and food accessibility’ by allowing developing countries to select which products would be disciplined under the rules of the Agreement on Agriculture; allowing developing countries to re-evaluate and adjust their tariff levels; provide greater flexibility for developing countries to use limited amounts of trade-distorting support under the de minimis provision (WTO, 1999a, art. 6.4); and allowing developing countries to use the special safeguard clause. Measures to reform developed country subsidies and tariffs were also included as part of the same proposal. The Indian government echoed many of these proposals in an early 2001 submission13 calling for the establishment of a ‘food security box’, which also contemplated measures to reform rules on ‘green box’ subsidies.14 Several of the elements outlined in the development box proposal were later to appear, in modified form, in subsequent negotiating submissions and texts.

50 The Doha declaration launching a new round of trade talks – dubbed the ‘Doha Development Agenda’ by the WTO – also made explicit reference to food security goals. It stated that developing countries would be accorded special and differential treatment so as to enable them to take account effectively of their development needs, ‘including food security and rural development’ (WTO, 2001, para. 13). Such treatment was to be an ‘integral part’ of all elements of the negotiations, the declaration said, in language that was to be echoed in a large number of negotiating proposals submitted in the years that were to follow.

15 ‘Substantial improvements in market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms o (. )

51 The dozens of proposals that invoked food security during the Doha Round, and in the years immediately before its launch, can be roughly divided into a handful of broad, non-exhaustive categories, largely reflecting the emphasis of the agriculture negotiations on four main areas15:

52 On market access, many developing countries sought to be granted greater flexibility on tariff commitments, and access to an agricultural safeguard that would allow themselves to shield producers from the effects of import surges or price depressions.

16 A provision allowing developing countries to exempt some input and investment subsidies from reduc (. )

53 Food security concerns were discussed in relation to trade-distorting support in general, but were also given particular attention in proposals for reform of the WTO’s green box, and for maintaining or expanding article 6.2 of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture.16.

54 The issue of food security also arose in negotiations on proposed new disciplines governing the provision of food aid, and in debates on export credits and other export competition issues.

55 Finally, importing countries in particular raised questions and concerns over food security in proposals on export restrictions (including export taxes and export prohibitions).

56 In each of these areas, different political constituencies and country grouping were active in seeking concessions.

17 See, for example, G-33 proposals: 1 June 2004 (JOB(04)/65); 3 June 2005 (JOB(05)/91); 12 Oct 2005 (. )

57 On special products and the special safeguard mechanism, a group of import-sensitive developing countries that came to be known as the G-33 argued in favour of greater flexibility on market access disciplines, on the basis that this was needed to safeguard the livelihoods, food security and longer-term development of their rural populations, including large numbers of small-scale producers that would be ill-equipped to compete with industrialised (and often also subsidised) agriculture elsewhere in the world.17 Analysis by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) and the South Centre – including country level studies – helped contribute to the evolution of countries’ negotiating positions on these issues (Mably, 2007; Wolfe, 2009; ICTSD/FAO, 2007; Matthews, 2018).

18 See, for example, various exporting country proposals: 2 May 2006 (JOB(06)/135); 3 May 2006 (JOB(0 (. )

58 The G-33 proposed allowing developing countries to designate a limited set of products as ‘special’ based on objective indicators of food security, livelihood security and rural development. Such indicators included, for example, the share of local income spent on a particular product, employment by product, productivity levels, rates of self-sufficiency, or the contribution of a product to local nutrition. Based on this country-specific analysis the tariffs of the selected products would then qualify for gentler reduction under the Doha Round, or would even be exempt from any cuts. The G-33, however, encountered opposition to their proposals from developed countries seeking greater access to developing country markets, such as the US, but also from exporting developing countries, such as Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay.18 Controversy over the special safeguard mechanism played a significant role in the breakdown of talks in July 2008 (ICTSD, 2008a).

59 Despite the disagreements in this area, the debate over special products in particular probably represents the most sophisticated attempt at defining food and livelihood security concerns in the WTO and how they relate to international trade. It is also symptomatic of how the discussion evolved over time in the trade body from a fairly narrow understanding of food security to a highly complex and differentiated approach based on indicators.

19 See African Group proposal, 20 Nov 2007 (JOB(02)/187).

60 Food security concerns were also given particular attention in the review of the criteria for green box subsidies, as well as in the negotiations on domestic support more generally. The African Group (a group of developing countries that seeks reform of developed country agriculture), along with the G-20, has sought to expand the flexibility that the green box allows developing countries in being able to use domestic support to pursue national development goals.19 Among other things, these proposals would involve modifying the language on support for public stockholding for food security purposes so as to remove the existing requirement that developing countries count purchases from low-income or resource-poor producers towards their ‘aggregate measure of support’ (AMS) – an upper ceiling which would be reduced as part of the Doha Round negotiations.

20 16 May 2006 (JOB(06)/145). 21 Arguably, civil society organisations also played an important role in highlighting some of these (. ) 22 See, for example, proposals dated 27 Sept 2002: Cairns Group (JOB(02)/132) and Canada (JOB(02)/131) 23 21 Dec 2000 (G/AG/NG/W/91), wto/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd11_nontrade_e. h(. ) 24 14 Dec 2000 (G/AG/NG/W/90), wto/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd11_nontrade_e. ht(. )

61 In addition to proposals favouring greater flexibility for developing countries to subsidise their own agriculture sectors, two other main trends can be identified in the discussions on green box reform and in the debate over domestic support more generally (Hepburn and Bellmann, 2009). The first of these is the concern expressed by the G-2020 and by efficient agricultural exporters in the Cairns Group, which have argued that trade-distorting support undermines competitiveness and food security in countries that do not subsidise their agricultural sectors.21 These countries have also argued that green box programmes may be causing more than minimal trade distortion, and called for the criteria for these payments to be tightened.22 The other major trend is characterised by the proposals of countries with highly protected and heavily subsidised agricultural sectors, which have resisted such demands. These countries – which include Japan23 and others in the G-10 coalition, as well as, to a lesser extent, the EU24 – have instead historically called for greater flexibility to allow WTO members to address ‘non-trade concerns’, including food security.

25 See WTO (2005), para. 6. The text further specifies:‘On food aid, we reconfirm our commitment to m (. ) 26 6 March 2006 (TN/AG/GEN/13). 27 25 Apr 2006 (JOB(06)/122). 28 7 Apr 2006 (JOB(06)/78).

62 Food security was also debated extensively in the negotiations over new rules on food aid. In exchange for agreeing, at the WTO’s Hong Kong Ministerial in 2005, to the elimination of export subsidies, the EU had pressed trading partners to adopt ‘disciplines on all export measures with equivalent effect’ – including food aid.25 At the heart of the debate was the notion that in-kind food aid or practices such as monetisation have sometimes disrupted local food markets and affected local producers. While members agreed that a ‘safe box’ would cover bona fide emergency situations, they also agreed to introduce rules that would prevent aid from undermining local producers in non-emergency situations. A proposal from the African and LDC groups26 formed the basis for negotiations, with further contributions from the European Community27 and the US28 – the world’s major provider of in-kind food aid (ICTSD, 2006).

29 Cairns Group, 21 Dec 2000 (G/AG/NG/W/93); Japan, 15 Nov 2002 (JOB(02)/164); Mauritius, 19 Nov 2002 (. )

63 While the impact of export restrictions on food security has been a concern of various WTO members since the start of the Doha Round,29 debate and controversy over this issue has recently intensified, as two episodes of unusually high food prices and predictions of a long-term upward price trend for agricultural products increase the pressure on food importing countries, especially in the developing world (ICTSD, 2018, 2018b, c). While net-food-importing countries have drawn on analysis (FAO et al., 2018) by FAO staff and other experts to argue that export restrictions endanger food security by exacerbating shortages and volatility on world markets, exporting countries have thus far resisted any attempts to introduce more systemic disciplines in this area that go beyond the relatively limited disciplines set out in the Agreement on Agriculture or contemplated in the latest draft Doha agriculture accord. In part, this may be because of the role such measures play in supporting a strategy of enhancing value-addition in the exporting countries’ agriculture sector, and partly because of concerns that they could serve a useful role in responding to potential domestic food shortages. However, possibly more important is a more generalised reluctance on the part of exporting countries to make concessions in the absence of more far-reaching disciplines on trade distortions on the import side.

64 Despite the post-2008 stalemate in the WTO’s Doha process, the same price trends and projections have helped to push food security back towards the top of the agenda in a number of political and policy-making processes, with the role of trade receiving some attention in this context. A series of high-level meetings – the G-8’s meeting in L’Aquila in 2008, the FAO’s World Summit on Food Security in 2009 and the G-20 gathering of agriculture ministers in 2018 – reflected the increased political importance being accorded to the question. However, while heads of state and ministers reaffirmed the importance of access to markets and pledged their commitment to raise agricultural productivity by boosting aid and investment, the WTO continues to be seen as the sole forum where concrete market access and subsidy commitments can be made. Even where agreement on trade-related measures has been reached, such as the G-20’s June 2018 accord on exempting humanitarian food purchases from export restrictions, governments have recommended that further action be taken at the WTO (ICTSD, 2018a). Other trade-related issues such as biofuel subsidies have proven to be too controversial to be addressed meaningfully by the G-8 or G-20 (Tangermann, 2018), leaving their food security implications unresolved for the time being.

65 The establishment of the UN’s High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis , the elaboration of its Comprehensive Framework of Action and the reform of the Committee on World Food Security (CWFS) were significant steps in the effort to improve global governance and enhance policy coherence in this area. The WTO, FAO and eight other relevant bodies also collaborated around the inter-agency report to the G-20 in the first half of 2018 (FAO et al., 2018). However, much more could still be done in this regard. Recent suggestions have included ensuring that the WTO Committee on Agriculture takes a more active role in reviewing food security issues related to trade, and strengthening the collaboration between the CWFS, the WTO, the World Bank and the Rome-based institutions (Ahmad, 2018). Reforming and improving the international governance framework is a necessary step towards overcoming current shortcomings on trade and food security, even though by itself it will not be sufficient to do so.

66 Measures to enhance policy coherence and to reform governance structures at the international level will, however, need to be accompanied by similar moves at the domestic level, especially in key countries. The disconnect between governance mechanisms responsible for development and aid, for the environment and for agricultural policy can mean that, for example, EU or US policies on farm subsidies may be at odds with policies pursued on related issues such as climate or poverty. Furthermore, to a great extent, the geopolitical tensions between countries and blocs that have thwarted progress on international trade issues are mirrored by similar tensions on climate change, food security and development issues more generally. Behind these lie configurations of domestic interests and political constituencies at the national and sub-national level. The shifting global economic landscape of the last decade has thrown up new opportunities and threats for different actors, in developed countries as well as in the so-called ‘emerging’ countries of the developing world, and created new challenges for the world’s poorest people – whether they live in the group of countries that the UN officially recognises as LDCs, or elsewhere.

67 Even among trade negotiators, there is a growing awareness that the multilateral trading system is proving increasingly incapable of demonstrating that it is flexible and adaptable enough to prove its relevance in a changing world. At the same time, negotiators are reluctant to abandon the investment that has been made in elaborating a package of farm trade disciplines that are perceived to go some way towards restructuring an agricultural trading system that has been heavily criticised for failing to deliver on a range of global public policy goals, including food security. Any decision to abandon the Doha talks, or place them in deep freeze, would arguably leave a large ‘Doha-shaped hole’: current patterns of trade-distorting support and tariff protection would remain unchanged, in addition to the new trade and food security challenges that are emerging. Until countries are able to resolve the growing contradictions between domestic policies on trade, food security, climate and international development, there is little prospect of achieving greater policy coherence in these areas at the global level.

5. Conclusion and the way forward.

68 The WTO is not what it used to be a decade or so ago. Many new developing countries have since joined, and shifts in the balance of global economic and political power have transformed the playing field. Accordingly, new needs and different expectations have emerged, including demands on the decision-making processes, and their fairness and transparency. As described above, modern global trade governance requires a careful balance between greater efficiency, legitimacy and inclusiveness. These objectives are not incompatible, but would require WTO members to move from essentially promoting their individual short-term mercantilist interests to developing a shared vision to effectively advance global public policy goals. Numerous proposals have been put forward to strengthen the multilateral trading system. But as for any intergovernmental institution, change must come, and be agreed to, from the inside. This calls for the establishment of an inclusive and bottom-up process, one that seeks input from all WTO members, as well as seeking submissions from the different actors in the international trade community. Only with such a process will ideas have a realistic chance to be considered, and be transformed into agents for strengthening the system.

30 See WT/GC/W/605, July 2009, wto/english/thewto_e/gcounc_e/meet_jul09_e. htm (accesse (. )

69 Years of near-exclusive focus on the Doha Round have inhibited institutional evolution and even diminished some of the WTO’s permanent, non-negotiating functions such as the work of the regular committees. Beyond the WTO negotiating function, there might be therefore merit in strengthening the work of the regular WTO committees. In the run-up to the 2009 Ministerial Conference, several such proposals were put on the table, notably by India.30 These covered a variety of issues such as the need to enhance the WTO trade information system by including data on non-tariff barriers; monitor developments in regional trade agreements (RTAs) and develop non-binding best practice guidelines for negotiating new RTAs; establish an ‘omnibus legal system’ that would address all forms of preferential market access for LDCs in a coherent way; address the increasing role of standards and standard-setting bodies in international trade. Many of these proposals are still relevant today.

70 Finally, in parallel with efforts to revive the Doha Round, members could undertake work on a number of pressing global challenges. These could include concerns around the trade dimension of food security, food prices and export restrictions; the potential trade impacts of emerging domestic policies designed to combat climate change; or highly controversial matters around exchange rate policies and current trade imbalances. This is not to say that the WTO should become the sole or even primary body to deal with these matters. Several other institutions such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), FAO or IMF have indeed a major role to play in this area. The WTO, as the main organisation dealing with trade rules, should nevertheless contribute to addressing them insofar as they are linked to trade. Willingness to do so has already been expressed by a wide and cross-cutting segment of the WTO membership, but as a first step it might be more realistic to address these issues in a non-negotiating setting. In doing so, members could assess whether the WTO rule book is properly equipped to deal with emerging challenges or whether existing disciplines need to be clarified or amended. Existing institutional structures such as the Committee on Agriculture could be used for such an exercise. Precedents for doing so already exist. Singapore, for example, has recently made a submission to the regular session of the Committee on Trade and Environment to embark on work examining possible trade applications of border tax adjustment as a way to address competitiveness and carbon leakage concerns in climate change. Such an approach would enable the system to address challenges of the twenty-first century and prepare the ground for future negotiations when the political situation is ripe.

Referências.

AFDB (African Development Bank), OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development), UNDP (United Nations Development Programme), UNECA (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa) (2018) African Economic Outlook 2018 (Paris: OECD).

Ahmad, M. (2018) Improving the International Governance of Food Security and Trade (Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development).

Anghie, A. (2005) Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Consultative Board to the Director-General (2004) The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Changes in the New Millennium (Geneva: World Trade Organization).

Cottier, T. and M. Elsig (2009) Reforming the WTO: The Decisions-Making Triangle Re-Addressed , paper presented at the World Trade Forum, World Trade Institute, University of Bern.

Cottier, T. and S. Takenoshita (2008) ‘Decisions-Making and the Balance of Powers in WTO Negotiations: Towards Supplementary Weighted Voting’, in Griller, S. (ed.) At the Crossroads: The World Trading System and the Doha Round (Vienna: Springer).

Croome, J. (1995) Reshaping the World Trading System (Geneva: World Trade Organisation – WTO).

Deere-Birbeck, C. (2009) Momentum Builds for Discussion of Reform at WTO Ministerial Conference , Global Economic Governance Programme’s blog, 20 November, globaleconomicgovernance/blog/2009/11/momentum-builds-for-discussion-on-wto-reform-at-wto-ministerial-conference/ (accessed on 27 September 2018).

Deere-Birbeck, C. and C. Monagle (2009) Strengthening Multilateralism: A Mapping of Selected Proposals on WTO Reform and Improvements in Global Trade Governance , discussion draft (Geneva/Oxford: ICTSD and Global Economic Governance Programme).

Elsig, M. (2008) The World Trade Organization at Work: Performance in a Member-Driven Milieu , paper presented at the Annual Convention of the International Studies Association, New York, 15–18 February.

Elsig, M. (2009) ‘WTO Decisions-Making: Can We Get a Little Help from the Secretariat and the Critical Mass’, in Steger, D. P. (ed.) Redesigning the World Trade Organization for the Twenty-first Century (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press).

FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization), IFAD (International Fund for Agricultural Development), IMF (International Monetary Fund), OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), WFP (World Food Programme), World Bank, WTO, IFPRI (International Food Policy Research Institute) and the UN HLTF (High-Level Task Force) (2018) Price Volatility in Food and Agricultural Markets: Policy Responses (Rome: FAO), fao/fileadmin/templates/est/Volatility/Interagency_Report_to_the_G20_on_Food_Price_Volatility. pdf (accessed on 27 September 2018).

FAO (1996) Rome Declaration on Food Security and World Food Summit Plan of Action , W3613 (Rome: FAO).

Harbinson, S. (2009) The Doha Round: ‘Death-Defying Agenda’ or ‘Don’t Do it Again?’ , ECIPE (European Centre for International Political Economy) Working Paper no. 10 (Brussels: ECIPE).

Hepburn, J. and C. Bellmann (2009) ‘Doha Round Negotiations on the Green Box and Beyond’, in Meléndez-Ortiz, R., C. Bellmann and J. Hepburn (eds.) Agricultural Subsidies in the WTO Green Box: Ensuring Coherence with Sustainable Development Goals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Hufbauer, G. (2005) ‘Inconsistencies Between Diagnosis and Treatment’, Journal of International Economic Law ,8(2), pp. 291–7.

ICTSD (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development) (2006) ‘EU Food Aid Paper Proposes Strict Disciplines to Prevent Commercial Displacement’, Bridges Weekly , 10(15), 3 May, ictsd/i/news/bridgesweekly/7394/ (accessed on 27 September 2018).

ICTSD (2008a) ‘Agricultural Safeguard Controversy Triggers Breakdown in Doha Round Talks’, Bridges Weekly , 12(27), 7 August, ictsd/i/news/bridgesweekly/18034/ (accessed on 27 September 2018).

ICTSD ( 2008b) ‘Concern Grows over New IP Agreement’, Bridges Monthly , 12(5), November, ictsd/downloads/bridges/bridges12-5.pdf (accessed on 27 September 2018).

ICTSD (2009) WTO Ministerial Conference Opens in Geneva: Expect No Surprises , Bridges Daily Update, 30 November, ictsd/i/wto/geneva/daily-updates-2009/geneva-2009-bridges-daily-updates/62462/ (accessed on 27 September 2018).

ICTSD (2018) ‘Under Threat of Higher Food Prices, WTO Members Debate Export Restrictions, Subsidies’, Bridges Weekly , 14(41), 24 November, ictsd/i/news/bridgesweekly/96974/ (accessed on 27 September 2018).

ICTSD (2018a) ‘G-20 Agriculture Ministers Unveil Plan to Tackle High Food Prices’, Bridges Weekly , 15(24), 29 June, ictsd/i/news/bridgesweekly/109720/ (accessed on 27 September 2018).

ICTSD (2018b) ‘OECD, FAO: No End for High Food Prices in Upcoming Decade’, Bridges Weekly , 15(23), 22 June, ictsd/i/news/bridgesweekly/109150/ (accessed on 27 September 2018).

ICTSD (2018c) ‘Agricultural Export Restrictions Spark Controversy at the WTO’, Bridges Weekly , 15(12), 6 April, ictsd/i/news/bridgesweekly/103579/ (accessed on 27 September 2018).

ICTSD ( 2018d) ‘Tensions Build over Chinese Rare Earth Quotas’, Bridges Trade BioRes , 11(16), 25 July, ictsd/i/news/biores/111203/(accessed on 27 September 2018).

ICTSD/FAO (2007) Indicators for the Selection of Agricultural Special Products: Some Empirical Evidence (Geneva: ICTSD).

Ismail, F. and B. Vickers (2018) ‘Towards Fair and Inclusive Decision-Making in WTO Negotiations’, in Deere-Birbeck, C. (ed.) Making Global Trade Governance Work for Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Jackson, J. (2001) ‘The WTO “Constitution” and Proposed Reforms: Seven “Mantras” Revisited’, Journal of International Economic Law , 4(1), pp. 67–78.

Keohane, R. and J. Nye (2000) Between Centralization and Fragmentation: The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy , paper presented at the American Political Science Convention, Washington, DC, 31 August–3 September.

Lamy, P. (2003) After Cancun , Statements by Pascal Lamy, EU Trade Commissioner, at the Press Conference Closing the 5th WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun on, 14 September , eurunion/news/press/2003/2003057.htm (accessed on 27 September 2018).

Low, P. (2009) WTO Decision Making for the Future , paper presented at Thinking Ahead on International Trade (TAIT) Inaugural Conference, Geneva, 17–18 September.

Mably, P. (2007) The Role of Research on Trade Policy Changes Affecting the Developing World: Group of 33 Influence at the World Trade Organization , Latin American Trade Network Working Paper no. 77 (Buenos Aires: Latin American School of Social Sciences), latn. ar/web/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/wp-77-Mably. pdf (accessed on 27 September 2018).

Matthews, A. (2018) The Impact of WTO Agricultural Trade Rules on Food Security and Development: An Examination of Proposed Additional Flexibilities for Developing Countries , IIIS (Institute for International Integration Studies) Discussion Paper no. 371 (Dublin: IIIS, Trinity College), tcd. ie/iiis/documents/discussion/pdfs/iiisdp371.pdf (accessed on 27 September 2018).

Mayer, J. (2018) Structural Change, Global Imbalances, and Employment in the Least Developed Countries , Policy Brief no. 1 (Geneva: ICTSD).

Oxfam (2002) Rigged Rules and Double Standards. Trade, Globalisation and the Fight Against Poverty (Brussels/Geneva/New York/Washington: Oxfam), maketradefair/assets/english/report_english. pdf (accessed on 27 September 2018).

Pauwelyn, J. (2005) ‘The Sutherland Report: A Missed Opportunity for Genuine Debate on Trade, Globalization and Reforming the WTO’, Journal of International Economic Law , 8(2), pp. 329–46.

Rodriguez Mendoza, M. and M. Wilke (2018) ‘Revisiting the Single Undertaking: Towards a More Balanced Approach to WTO Negotiations’, in Deere-Birbeck C. (ed.) (2018) Making Global Trade Governance Work for Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Rolland, S. (2018) ‘Redesigning the Negotiation Process at the WTO’, Journal of International Economic Law , 13(65), pp. 65–110.

Steger, D. (ed.) (2009) ‘Why Institutional Reform of the WTO is Necessary’, in Redesigning the World Trade Organization (Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press), pp. 3–11.

Steinberg, R. (2002) ‘In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes at the GATT/WTO’, International Organizations , 56(2), pp. 339–74.

UNCTAD (2018) World Investment Report 2018, Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development (Geneva: UNCTAD).

United Nations General Assembly (2000) United Nations Millennium Declaration . A/RES/55/2 (New York: United Nations).

United Nations General Assembly (1948) Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: United Nations), un/en/documents/udhr/ (accessed on 27 September 2018).

United Nations General Assembly (1966) International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (New York: United Nations), www2.ohchr/english/law/cescr. htm (accessed on 27 September 2018).

Van Grasstek, C. and P. Sauvé (2006) ‘The Consistency of WTO Rules: Can the Single Undertaking be Squared with Variable Geometry’, Journal of International Economic Law , 9(4), pp. 837–64.

Warwick Commission (2007) The Multilateral Trade Regime: Which Way Forward? (Coventry: Warwick University).

Wolfe, R. (2009) ‘The Special Safeguard Fiasco in the WTO: The Perils of Inadequate Analysis and Negotiation’, World Trade Review , 8(4), pp. 517–44.

WTO (1999a) ‘Agreement on Agriculture’, in The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

WTO (1999b) ‘Decision on the Application and Review of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes’,in The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Warwick Commission (2007) The Multilateral Trade Regime: Which Way Forward? (Coventry: The University of Warwick).

WTO (1999c) ‘Decision on Measures Concerning the Possible Negative Effects of the Reform Programme on Least-Developed and Net Food-Importing Developing Countries’, in The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

WTO (1999d) ‘Marrakech Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization’,in The Legal Texts: The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

WTO (2001) Doha Ministerial Declaration , WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Doha: WTO).

WTO (2005) Hong Kong Ministerial Declaration , WT/MIN(05)/DEC (Hong Kong: WTO).

WTO (2009) Strengthening the WTO , WT/MIN(09)/W/1, Communication from Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Hong Kong China, European Communities, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Norway, South Africa, Switzerland, Turkey, United States and Uruguay (Geneva: WTO).

WTO (2018a) World Trade Report 2018. The WTO and Preferential Trade Agreements: From Co-existence to Coherence (Geneva: WTO).

WTO (2018b) Quarterly World Merchandise Trade by Region and Selected Economies (Geneva: WTO), wto/english/res_e/statis_e/quarterly_world_exp_e. htm (accessed on 8 November 2018).

1 The Warwick Report , for example, provides one of the most notable and comprehensive stock-taking exercises produced by non-governmental experts (Warwick Commission, 2007). Another critical milestone in this debate was the report commissioned in 2003 by Dr Supachai Panitchpakdi, then Director General of the World Trade Organization (WTO), to a panel of experts chaired by the former Director General of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), Peter Sutherland, on ‘ The Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millennium’ . Despite its comprehensive analysis and concrete recommendations, the Sutherland Report was, however, criticised as a defence of the status quo , produced by insiders, thus lacking novel approaches (Hufbauer, 2005; Pauwelyn, 2005). As such it did not provide the necessary impetus to initiate a structured discussion among members.

2 When governments launched the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations under the GATT in 1986, the declared aim was not to establish a standing global organisation on trade governance. What later became the WTO, only emerged over the last few months of the almost eight years’ lasting negotiations. When members realised that the trade package to be presented at the end of the negotiation round would include new areas such as intellectual property rights and services, the need arose to discuss processes and structures that would ensure the coherence of these different agreements. The decision to establish the WTO finally stemmed from that discussion and other related considerations in the negotiation Group on the Functioning of the GATT (FOGS). Since no systemic, long-term negotiations had taken place on a potential international organisation, most agreements (with the exception of the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) which had been revised completely during the Uruguay Round) thus replicate the principles that have served that GATT for the last five decades. Moreover, when members launched the ongoing Doha Round they referred back to the negotiation principles used during the Uruguay Round, namely the principles of consensus and single undertaking. See Rodriguez Mendoza and Wilke (2018).

3 The consensus principle dates back to the International Trade Organization (ITO) and with it the early beginnings of the GATT. See Ismail and Vickers (2018).

4 ‘With the exception of the improvements and clarifications of the DSU, the conduct, conclusion and entry into force of the outcome of the negotiations shall be treated as parts of a single undertaking. However, agreements reached at an early stage may be implemented on a provisional or a definitive basis. Early agreements shall be taken into account in assessing the overall balance of the negotiations’ (WTO, 2001, para. 47).

5 Note that weighted voting at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) is based on the level of a country’s financial contribution to the organisation’s budget. Currently the United States holds roughly 17 per cent of the votes, with the G-7 holding a total of 45 per cent. WTO-related proposals certainly differ from this, yet there are important lessons to be learnt from the World Banks’ and IMF’s experience with ‘power-based’ voting.

6 ‘ The agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annex 4 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Plurilateral Trade Agreements’) are also part of this Agreement for those Members that have accepted them, and are binding on those Members. The Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not create either obligations or rights for Members that have not accepted them’ (WTO, 1999d, Article II:3).

7 See for instance the 2003 ‘Memorandum on the Need to Improve Internal Transparency and Participation in the WTO’ by the Third World Network, Oxfam International, Public Services International, World Wildlife Fund International, The Center for International Environmental Law, Focus on the Global South, The Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, The Africa Trade Network, The International General and Trade Network, and the Tebtebba International Centre for Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, 13 July 2003.

8 For instance, during the 7th Ministerial Conference in 2009, the delegation of Uruguay called upon the WTO members to ‘not confuse the […] Ministerial with [various kinds of negotiation sessions]. There would be no justification for continuing to postpone the regular revocation of the topmost body of the WTO, particularly in the current world economic and trade environment, which requires international cooperation, direct political involvement at the multilateral level, and strong credible institutions’ (WTO, 2009).

9 Policies directed at ensuring food security certainly reach beyond the trade arena. Investment in the agriculture sector, land rights and access to water and other natural resources are of equal importance in this context. However, the following discussion will be limited to the interface of the multilateral trading system and food security.

10 ‘Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life’(FAO, 1996).

11 See, for example, proposals from the developing country ‘Like Minded Group’ (23 June 2000), G/AG/NG/W/13; Kenya (12 March 2001), G/AG/NG/W/136; and Small Island Developing States (29 December 2000), G/AG/NG/W/97, wto/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd02_props1_e. htm (accessed on 27 September 2018).

12 Cuba, Dominican Republic, Honduras, Pakistan, Haiti, Nicaragua, Kenya, Uganda, Zimbabwe, Sri Lanka and El Salvador (23 June 2000), G/AG/NG/W/13, wto/english/tratop_e/agric_e/negs_bkgrnd02_props1_e. htm (accessed on 27 September 2018).

14 Domestic support measures that are exempt from reduction commitments on the basis that they cause not more than minimal distortion of trade or production, set out in Annex 2 of the Agreement on Agriculture.

15 ‘Substantial improvements in market access; reductions of, with a view to phasing out, all forms of export subsidies; and substantial reductions in trade-distorting domestic support’ (WTO, 2001, para. 13).

16 A provision allowing developing countries to exempt some input and investment subsidies from reduction commitments.

17 See, for example, G-33 proposals: 1 June 2004 (JOB(04)/65); 3 June 2005 (JOB(05)/91); 12 Oct 2005 (JOB(05)/230); 22 Nov 2005 (JOB(05)/304); 22 Nov 2005 (JOB(05)/303); 11 May 2006 (JOB(06)/143); 7 June 2006 (JOB(06)/173); 16 June 2006 (JOB(06)/189/Rev.1); 28 Mar 2007 (JOB(07)/35); 3 June 2008 (JOB(08)/47); 28 Jan 2018 (TN/AG/GEN/30).

18 See, for example, various exporting country proposals: 2 May 2006 (JOB(06)/135); 3 May 2006 (JOB(06)/137); 20 February 2008 (JOB(08)/6); 8 April 2008 (JOB(08)/24).

19 See African Group proposal, 20 Nov 2007 (JOB(02)/187).

20 16 May 2006 (JOB(06)/145).

21 Arguably, civil society organisations also played an important role in highlighting some of these connections. See, for example, Oxfam (2002).

22 See, for example, proposals dated 27 Sept 2002: Cairns Group (JOB(02)/132) and Canada (JOB(02)/131).

25 See WTO (2005), para. 6. The text further specifies:‘On food aid, we reconfirm our commitment to maintain an adequate level and to take into account the interests of food aid recipient countries. To this end, a “safe box” for bona fide food aid will be provided to ensure that there is no unintended impediment to dealing with emergency situations. Beyond that, we will ensure elimination of commercial displacement. To this end, we will agree effective disciplines on in-kind food aid, monetization and re-exports so that there can be no loop-hole for continuing export subsidization.’

26 6 March 2006 (TN/AG/GEN/13).

27 25 Apr 2006 (JOB(06)/122).

28 7 Apr 2006 (JOB(06)/78).

29 Cairns Group, 21 Dec 2000 (G/AG/NG/W/93); Japan, 15 Nov 2002 (JOB(02)/164); Mauritius, 19 Nov 2002 (JOB(02)/182); Cuba, 20 Jan 2003 (JOB(02)/190/Corr.1; Korea, 18 Dec 2002 (JOB(02)/220); Japan, 28 Feb 2003 (JOB(03)/41; G-20), 18 May 2006 (JOB(06)/147); Japan and Switzerland, 30 Apr 2008 (JOB(08)/34); Net Food-Importing Developing Countries, 6 Apr 2018 (JOB/AG/18).

List of illustrations.

Cite this article.

Electronic reference.

Christophe Bellmann , Jonathan Hepburn and Marie Wilke , « The Challenges Facing the Multilateral Trading System in Addressing Global Public Policy Objectives », International Development Policy | Revue internationale de politique de développement [Online], 3 | 2018, Online since 27 February 2018, connection on 25 January 2018. URL : journals. openedition/poldev/1012 ; DOI : 10.4000/poldev.1012.

Sobre os autores.

Christophe Bellmann.

Programmes Director at the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD). He has previously worked for the Swiss Coalition of Development Organisations. He also was a Research Associate at the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean in Santiago.

By this author.

Jonathan Hepburn.

Agriculture Programme Manager, International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD). Before joining ICTSD, he represented Oxfam International at the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Washington, and led Oxfam’s global campaign on aid, debt and the Millennium Development Goals. He previously worked on trade, development and human rights issues at the Quaker United Nations Office in Geneva.

By this author.

Marie Wilke.

International Trade Law Programme Officer at the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD). Previously she worked for the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and for the German Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology. She holds a law degree from Hanse Law School and an LLM in Public International Law from Helsinki University (summa cum laude).

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 3.0 Unported License.

Índice.

Full text issues.

Alternative Pathways to Sustainable Development 8.2 | 2017.

Sustainable Food Consumption, Urban Waste Management and Civic Activism 8.1 | 2017.

Articles 8.1 8 | 2017.

Development as a Battlefield 7 | 2017.

Combining Economic and Political Development 7.1 | 2018.

Articles 7.1 6.2 | 2018.

Articles and Debates 6.2 6 | 2018.

Large-Scale Land Acquisitions 5.3 | 2018.

Articles and Debates 5.3 5.2 | 2018.

Articles and Debates 5.2 5 | 2018.

Education, Learning, Training 4.3 | 2018.

Articles and Debates 4.3 4.2 | 2018.

Articles and Debates 4.2 4 | 2018.

Religion and development 3 | 2018.

Aid, Emerging Economies and Global Policies 2 | 2018.

Energy and Development 1 | 2018.

Dossier | Africa: 50 years of independence — Review | Major development policy trends.

All issues.

About the Journal.

Siga-nos.

Boletins informativos.

In collaboration with.

Electronic ISSN 1663-9391.

Newsletters and alerts Newsletter Subscribe to the newsletter Alerts and subscriptions Alert service OpenEdition Freemium.

Informations Title: International Development Policy | Revue internationale de politique de développement Briefly:

Peer-reviewed journal that promotes cutting-edge research and policy debates on global development. Published by the Graduate Institute | Geneva, it links up with international policy negotiations involving Geneva-based organisations.

Comments and Questions.

This paper makes some very interesting points and is well-worth the read. It puts on the table a lot of interesting issues. Some comments:

I agree with the author that the WTO as an institution of global governance is sound and successful. But have FTAs . [Mais]

. really “undermined” the multilateral system? This statement seems to contradict the author's own arguments that the WTO is “in charge” and the international trade is doing so well. Also what about the empirical evidence? Is Europe worse off with the (discriminatory) Single Market Programme? ASEAN worse off with AFTA and the AEC? This typical approach that berates perhaps good but second best policies in favor of an ideal that has shown itself to be politically unobtainable at present is getting a bit old.

I think that a very clear case can be made for global free trade. It can also be made for non-discriminatory concerted liberalization, or even unilateral liberalization. Yet, economists have been unsuccessful in getting politicians to follow this strategy. One would think that after all these years we would have learned more about political economy! Here we see it also regarding “the Transatlantic Liberalization Initiative”, which both Rolf and the author advocate: good economics, naïve politics. Did the APEC “Bogor Vision”, which was predicated on the same economics, produce anything? A bit on trade facilitation but not much toward the stated goal of a region of open trade and investment.

In Section 2.1: it is indeed good news that international trade has been booming and barriers have been coming down. No doubt the Uruguay Round contributed to liberalization, but an embrace of outward-orientation in developing countries was arguably far more significant for these changes (as noted by Bhagwati in In Defense of Globalization, quoted later in the paper).

This section offers an interesting overview but it might improve the current discussion of trade in services liberalization with some actual data. In particular, the author might reference the new database just launched by the OECD-WTO on “Trade in Value Added” (TiVA), which offers very interesting insight into changing services trade. For example, while services trade relative to goods trade remained fairly constant at between one-fifth and one-fourth—even as the importance of services in most developed and developing economies has risen significantly—using the TiVA data we see that it is now at about one-half! & # 13;

In addition, in looking at trends in international trade, I think that it is important for the author to underscore the rising importance of production chains in driving these trade numbers, as well as how they inflate them via double - (and x-) counting. Again, we get more insight on this from the TiVA database. But note that almost 50% of China’s imports are processing imports, which means that they have to be used in exports; China is the largest exporter in the world in terms of nominal data, but not value added. The Japanese data are particularly interesting: China became its largest export market long ago using nominal trade values, but on a value added basis the United States continues to be the most important.

I note that the one “success” for developing countries in the Doha DEVELOPMENT Agenda, the Aid for Trade initiative, isn’t even mentioned in the paper. I think that it should be (especially given the research suggesting its positive contributions and the fact that it has risen to about $32 billion in disbursements in 2018). & # 13;

The author makes a good point that the rise in protectionism during the Great Recession is often greatly exaggerated. There were, of course, some instances, but there are always some instances even in good times (the Global Trade Alert, for example, does not benchmark). And it could have been a lot worse!

The major problem with a weak Doha is that it will still leave PTAs as the only game in town. The private sector is demanding far more from commercial policy liberalization than a weak Doha would offer. I agree that we need a success; but a weak Doha will mean that we won’t be looking at another “result” for another decade or two. & # 13;

On the drop in export subsidies: it is odd that the author avoids completely the price spikes in relevant commodities that made it unnecessary to use the subsidies! What about more recent data, after prices came down after the 2007-08 price spikes? Looking at the changes may cause the author to reduce his enthusiasm.

Finally, I believe that the author would do well to pick up intra-BRIC disputes in preventing a successful Doha. The North-South focus is no doubt justified but is only part of the story; Brazil and India simply don’t want to give up too much to what they see as an overly-competitive China. Note Brazil’s proposal to offset undervalued exchange rates by raising bilateral tariffs.

In sum, while I do have some quibbles, I found the paper to be an interesting read and it makes some interesting points regarding where international trade governance has been, where it is going, and what can be done to contribute to the goal of promoting global free trade.

Trump and the challenges to the multilateral trading system.

'The United States, Europe, and China: Imminent Challenges to the Multilateral Trading System' was the subject of a distinguished lecture by Chad Bown, Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics in Washington, DC and Research Fellow at CEPR in London at the World Trade Institute on 6 February.

Bown, who said an alternative title to his talk could simply be ‘Trump’, described it as an attempt to understand what is happening in the United States since the new president took office last month.

Donald Trump’s election could be explained by the fact that generations of US workers have failed to adjust to the increasingly disruptive forces of automation and globalisation, said Bown. For that reason a sufficiently sizable share of the electorate chose a new president who appears to value deals more than rules.

Aside from the US presidential election, 2018 also marked the 15th anniversary of China's entry into the World Trade Organization. While China wrestles with its own period of adjustment away from an export-oriented to a consumer-based economy, it is under attack for not having transformed into the market economy that its trading partners had hoped.

Meanwhile, the European Union has been forced to turn increasingly inward since the global financial crisis – to address a series of first economic and now political crises.

The timing and combination of these issues all pose a challenge to the multilateral, GATT/WTO system, which marks its 70th birthday this year.

China’s entry to the WTO in 2001 raised concerns over competition and cheap imports and the surging Asian economy has been blamed for the loss of millions of manufacturing jobs in the US. Bown pointed to research that had shown that China could only be held responsible for 20 percent of these job losses.

This loss of jobs was not unexpected, said Bown, but manufacturing workers were not able to move to other jobs or areas that were growing. The US was not adequately prepared to deal with this shock.

Another issue was that when China entered the WTO it was not a market economy, although it was becoming more market-oriented. Fifteen years later the country has shifted from the state-owned enterprise model, but government and party officials continue to serve in the management or boards of companies. Other problems are the availability of cheap 'directed lending' that spreads to the whole of the economy, rendering prices meaningless, a lack of transparency and intellectual property rights.

China continues to be so important because it is huge. The decisions it makes spill over to the rest of the world and call into question the future of the world trading system, said Bown, adding that concerns over China would be the same regardless of who won the US presidential election.

Under Obama a ‘piecemeal’ approach was taken to exert leverage on China through bringing WTO disputes and export restrictions. The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was an attempt at a rules-based alternative to address US concerns.

“Trump will not follow the same path,” said Bown. “The signals are that he is interested in blowing up the existing system.” While Trump is unclear about his policy, the rhetoric during his campaign was very negative, and he is doing what he said he would since entering office. On its first day Trump’s cabinet withdrew from TPP.

If Trump does ‘blow up’ the system he will have the choice of leaving it blown up or reconstructing it from scratch, said Bown. A sign will be whether the administration continues to pursue disputes initiated by Obama at the WTO, such as over raw materials and aluminium subsidies, or decides on a new approach by filing more aggressive and riskier cases against China.

For its part, China has filed a dispute against the US and the EU for treating it as a non-market economy (NME). Some people expect that if China gets market economy status a flood of imports will follow and the trade system will collapse. Bown does not believe this will happen.

More disputes could follow. A blueprint for a major overhaul of tax in the US proposes moving away from corporate tax and replacing it with a destination-based cash flow tax (DBCFT). If implemented this could have the effect of an import tariff and be viewed as discriminatory, triggering a potential WTO dispute from trading partners over lost trade. If the US was to lose this it could face retaliation, with other countries being authorised to raise their tariffs to eliminate 220 billion dollars of US exports in the largest WTO retaliation ever seen.

Also on the cards is a renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Trump’s problem is with the North American supply chain and the fact that much final assembly work takes place in Mexico rather than the US. The president would rather see a return to the 1950s where everything was made in a plant in Indiana, Bown said.

A possible way out would be – ironically, given Trump’s opposition to it - the TPP, whose provisions on labour and the environment actually discourage US companies from moving to Mexico by making Mexican workers more expensive and levelling the playing field. Mexico has already agreed to these provisions in the TPP, Bown pointed out.

Regarding US policy towards the EU, Bown said he was concerned that the new administration might see it as being in its interests to inflame internal EU issues, as it has already shown signs of doing with its accusations of German currency manipulation and its support for Brexit.

Challenges to the Multilateral Trading System.

Abstrato.

Ever since the GATT was established in 1948, the growth in international trade and economic growth has been remarkable. The traditional mercantilism of trade relations is less and less appropriate for the global economy. Bilateral trade deals make the business environment more complex and unpredictable. Preferential trading agreements erode the principle of non-discrimination. They distort trade away from the underlying comparative advantage; create rents which are appropriated by special producer interests; multiply the complexities associated with aspects such as rules of origin, technical regulations, health and safety standards and administrative arrangements. They are also far harder to enforce than WTO rules, whose resolution mechanism has been very effective. Partial agreements outside the scope of the WTO lack the power of universal rules and legally binding commitments. Regarding the Doha Round of WTO negotiations, a key contradiction from the start was its construction as a ‘development’ round. This concept gave developing countries unrealistic expectations and opened the way for a damaging emphasis on the idea that they should not be required to make the same commitments to WTO rules as the developed countries. But avoiding WTO commitments almost always operates against the long-term economic interests of developing countries. The true development agenda lies in making commitments to WTO rules, rather than in seeking exemptions from them under the rubric of ‘special and differential treatment’. The steps needed to move forward are practical measures to reform the WTO and its processes, as well as longer-term steps towards enhancing political commitment to the framework of multilateral trade.

Baixe informações.

Se você tiver problemas ao fazer o download de um arquivo, verifique se você possui o aplicativo apropriado para vê-lo primeiro. Em caso de problemas adicionais, leia a página de ajuda IDEAS. Observe que esses arquivos não estão no site IDEAS. Seja paciente porque os arquivos podem ser grandes.

Informações bibliográficas.

Issue (Month): 1 (January)

Pesquisa relacionada.

Referências.

Nenhuma referência listada em IDEAS.

Você pode ajudá-los a preencher este formulário.

O projeto CitEc ainda não encontrou citações para este item.

Este item não está listado na Wikipédia, em uma lista de leitura ou entre os principais itens em IDEAS.

Estatisticas.

Correções.

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:wej:wldecn:264. Veja informações gerais sobre como corrigir o material no RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Ed Jones)

Se você é autor deste item e ainda não está registrado no RePEc, recomendamos que você o faça aqui. Isso permite vincular seu perfil a este item. Ele também permite que você aceite citações em potencial para este item sobre o qual não temos certeza.

Se as referências faltam completamente, você pode adicioná-las usando este formulário.

Se as referências completas listarem um item que está presente no RePEc, mas o sistema não ligou a ele, você pode ajudar com este formulário.

Se você souber de itens faltantes citando este, você pode nos ajudar a criar esses links, adicionando as referências relevantes da mesma maneira que acima, para cada item referente. Se você é um autor registrado deste item, você também pode querer verificar a guia "citações" em seu perfil, pois pode haver citações em espera de confirmação.

Observe que as correções podem levar algumas semanas para filtrar os vários serviços do RePEc.

Mais serviços.

Siga as séries, revistas, autores e Mais.

Novos trabalhos por e-mail.

Inscreva-se para novas adições ao RePEc.

Registro de autor.

Perfis públicos para pesquisadores de economia.

Vários rankings de pesquisa em Economia e Campos relacionados.

Quem era um aluno de quem, usando RePEc.

RePEc Biblio.

Artigos curados e amp; artigos sobre vários temas econômicos.

Carregue o seu papel para ser listado em RePEc e IDEAS.

EconAcademics.

Agregador de blogs para pesquisa econômica.

Plágio.

Casos de plágio em Economia.

Documentos de mercado de trabalho.

Série de papel de trabalho RePEc dedicada ao mercado de trabalho.

Fantasy League.

Imagine que você está no comando de um departamento de economia.

Serviços do StL Fed.

Dados, pesquisa, aplicativos e mais do St. Louis Fed.

Challenges to the Multilateral Trading System: The Rising Trade Protectionism Amid the Global Economic Recession.

14 Pages Posted: 27 Oct 2009.

Stanislav Bucifal.

Australian National University (ANU) - Crawford School of Public Policy.

Date Written: October 26, 2009.

Since the end of WWII, significant progress has been made on the road the liberalisation of global trade. The establishment of a rule-based multilateral trading system administered by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) has been an important part of this process. Yet trade-restricting national policies continue to flourish. The global economic recession has introduced new threats to international trade and highlighted the challenges facing the multilateral trading system.

Keywords: Trade protectionism, Mulilateral trade, International trade, Trading system, WTO, Global recession, Industry assistance, Government bailout.

JEL Classification: E62, F02, F15, F17, F21, F42, H30, H87.

Stanislav Bucifal (Contact Author)

Australian National University (ANU) - Crawford School of Public Policy ( email )

ANU College of Asia and the Pacific.

J. G. Crawford Building, #132, Lennox Crossing.

Canberra, Australian Capital Territory 0200.

Estatísticas de papel.

Jornais relacionados.

Organizations & Markets: Policies & Processes eJournal.

Assine este boletim de taxas para mais artigos com curadoria sobre este tópico.

Comércio internacional eJournal.

Assine este boletim de taxas para mais artigos com curadoria sobre este tópico.

Political Economy: Fiscal Policies & Behavior of Economic Agents eJournal.

Assine este boletim de taxas para mais artigos com curadoria sobre este tópico.

Links rápidos SSRN.

Rankings SSRN.

Sobre SSRN.

Os cookies são usados ​​por este site. Para recusar ou aprender mais, visite nossa página Cookies. This page was processed by apollo1 in 0.219 seconds.